Abstract: In this paper, we propose a secure and scalable user authentication scheme for heterogeneous wireless sensor networks to prevent intrusions. Our scheme employs both public and secret key cryptography schemes, such that it takes advantages from both. Our analysis and simulation results show that our scheme is not only more secure and scalable than existing secret key cryptography based schemes, but also requires less processing power and provides higher energy efficiency than existing public key cryptography based schemes.
Introduction
Wireless sensor networking continue to grow as one of the most exciting and challenging research area of engineering. There are many applications of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), which are intended to monitor physical and environmental phenomena, such as ocean and wildlife, earthquake, pollution, wild fire, water quality; to gather information regarding human activities, such as health care, manufacturing machinery performance, building safety, military surveillance and reconnaissance, highway traffic, and etc.
In any kind of networks, there are two major steps to ensure security: intrusion prevention and intrusion detection. As a first line of defense, network is secured by using intrusion prevention methods such as authentication, authorization, access control, etc. From computer security, we know that no system is completely secure unless it has no connection to outside world (close network). Hence, we are dealing with networking which means multiple of connections to outside world (open network), the intrusions are inevitable. Here, the second line of defense comes into the picture-intrusion detection: any kind of intruder that has managed to pass the first line of defense needs to be captured by this step. Our paper contributes to the first line of defense, namely to the intrusion prevention for heterogeneous WSNs.
One of the major methods used for intrusion prevention is User Authentication (UA): If a user does not have enough credentials then (s)he will be denied to access the network. This would eventually prevent intrusions throughout the network, provided that the UA scheme is very well designed to cover entire network and leaving no weak points in terms of security. UA is critically needed for networks that are transferring confidential (sensitive and valuable) information to the legitimate users; such as the coordinates of a hostile vehicle for a military surveillance application, medical statistics of a patient for a health care application, etc.
Tactical WSN is a very good example of UA application. Let us say a WSN is deployed in warfare conditions and is used to gather tactical information of enemy forces on the war field. In this example, we will use the concept of proximity sensors that discover any vehicle or a soldier in their preset perimeter. Location of any hostile vehicle or soldier is very important under warfare and should be available to only friend forces to assess tactical advantage. Any friendly vehicle or a soldier should not trigger an alarm in the proximity sensors (by using predefined communications using UA), but any existence of foe would do so. This is achieved by UA.
Health care is another example of UA application for WSNs. Let us say a WSN offers instantaneous medical data service to subscribed health care employees such as doctors and nurses. Since the confidentiality of the data is important (i.e. privacy of patient medical records), only the legitimate users should get a response to their queries. Unauthorized users must be prevented from accessing the mentioned confidential information. Therefore UA is a must in these kinds of networks.
WSNs are characterized by unique characteristics:
• Severely constrained computational and energy resources: limited power supplies (limited energy), small memory sizes.
• Ad hoc operational environment: There is no structured network (there is no dedicated router or switch for network operations)and transmission bandwidth is narrow.
Therefore security techniques used in traditional networks cannot be adopted directly. As a result, although UA has been well studied for traditional networks, the models proposed for those networks cannot be applied directly to WSNs because of the unique characteristics that WSNs possess. UA in such a resource constrained WSN with minimum overhead provides significant challenges and is an ongoing area of research. UA is very important for WSNs. In order to save the diminishing power resources, network should not be accessible by the unauthorized users. Any extra data transmission in the network generated by the malicious users (eg. flood messages) may cause battery power of a sensor node to be depleted faster. In a WSN, since an adversary can easily inject messages, any node receiving a message needs to make sure that the data used in any decision-making process originates from the correct source. UA prevents unauthorized parties from participating in the network: legitimate nodes should be able to detect messages from unauthorized nodes and reject them. UA is an intended feature that would prevent intruders and this way ensure trustability for WSN users.
In this paper, we propose a secure and scalable UA scheme to prevent intrusions in WSNs. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides related work for UA in WSNs, motivation of this work and our research goals. Section 3 presents our proposed TLUA scheme. Section 4 provides the security analysis of TLUA scheme. Performance evaluation of TLUA scheme is provided analytically in Section 5 and by simulations in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and outlines future work.
Related work, motivation and research goals
Recently, several schemes have been introduced as a UA scheme for WSNs: Wong et al. (Wong et al., 2006) (throughout the paper we call this as WZCW scheme) proposed a dynamic UA scheme for homogenous WSNs. Later this work was improved by Tseng et al. (Tseng et al., 2007) (throughout the paper we call this as TJY scheme) with the following advantages; including resistance of the replay and forgery attacks, reduction of user's password leakage risk, capability of a changeable password, and better efficiency. As discussed in (Wong et al., 2006) , authors claim that weak-password authentication is not suitable for WSNs because it loads the computational overhead to the used cryptography algorithm. In other words the algorithm must be strong enough to compensate for the weakness in the key. Therefore they recommend strong-password authentication for WSNs in which computational load is light, owing to the strength in the key. As a summary, both schemes use SKC for UA throughout the network which is not scalable for a large number of sensor nodes and users. Although Benenson et al.' s scheme (throughout the paper we call this as BGR scheme) (Benenson et al., 2005) uses PKC for UA, it is not practical for WSNs because of the homogenous network structure, meaning that all the power and processing demanding PKC operations are supposed to be handled on the normal sensor nodes. As a result, authentication operations take minutes (as the authors of (Benenson et al., 2005) confess) and batteries of the sensor nodes deplete faster (according to findings of (Wander et al., 2005) ).
To the best of our knowledge, the only heterogeneous approach to the UA in WSNs in the literature is ) scheme (throughout the paper we call this as TTUA scheme). In TTUA scheme, CHs are used as a backbone in the network so that the sensed data, after being collected, are transmitted through CHs towards the requesting users. For authentication purpose, SKC is issued between the CHs and the users. However, it is practically impossible to scale SKC keys to include a large number of users and sensor nodes, because of the memory limitations. Besides, in SKC, excluding existing users from the network and including new users to the network, requires key revoking and key re-distribution, which needs a considerable amount of communication overhead. These are the biggest constraints of the TTUA scheme.
The schemes mentioned above use either PKC approach (BGR) or SKC approach (WZCW, TJY and TTUA). Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. PKC is preferable in terms of scalability and key management, but it is unsuitable for the sensor nodes due to higher processing power requirement and lower energy efficiency. In contrast, SKC is preferable in terms of lower processing power requirement and higher energy efficiency, but it is not scalable because of memory restrictions and it requires a complicated key pre-distribution, user revocation and key re-distribution.
WZCW, TJY, and BGR schemes are using homogenous WSN architecture, in which the network consists of one type of sensor node only. Nowadays, because of having better performance, heterogeneous WSN architecture is on demand. This kind of network consists of two types of nodes: Cluster Heads (CHs) and sensor nodes(s). TTUA scheme adopts heterogeneous WSN architecture and owing to the high processing powered CHs, it offers better performance compared to WZCW, TJY and BGR schemes. On the other hand, it is based on SKC just like as WZCW and TJY schemes. Therefore, it is not scalable for thousands of sensor nodes and users, occupies a significant memory to store authentication codes. Thus, addition of new nodes and users is troublesome in terms of key distribution.
In this paper, we propose a secure and scalable UA scheme, termed as Two Level User Authentication (TLUA), to overcome mentioned shortcomings of the current state of the art schemes (namely WZCW, TTUA, TJY and BGR schemes). In our scheme, we adopt the idea of a two level heterogeneous network architecture in which a user communicates with a sensor node through Cluster Head (CH) of that sensor node. Our scheme uses Public Key Cryptography (PKC) between CHs and users, and Secret Key Cryptography (SKC) between CHs and sensor nodes (We presented basics of our scheme in (Butun and Sankar, 2011) and then presented early findings of performance evaluations in (Butun et al., 2012) .).
This work extends our previous efforts in a more comprehensive, presentable and conclusive way; then evaluates our TLUA scheme and compare its performance with state of the art schemes in the literature (namely TTUA, TJY a and BGR schemes). Evaluations are provided in two ways:
1. Analysis on the following criteria are provided:
• memory storage requirement,
• scalability,
• communication cost (in terms of time and energy),
• computational cost.
2. Simulation on energy consumption and total delays are provided.
Two Level User Authentication Scheme
Part of our scheme is first presented in (Butun and Sankar, 2011) . In this work, in order to relieve the confusion in the terminology (among the tiered networks and our two level architecture), we re-named our scheme as Two Level User Authentication Scheme (TLUA).
In our TLUA scheme, we adopted the idea of two level heterogeneous network architecture of TTUA scheme in which a user communicates with a sensor node through CH of that sensor node. Our proposed scheme not only keeps all the advantages of the TTUA scheme but also enhances its security by issuing PKC. Therefore, TLUA adopts (inherits) all the advantages of the PKC over SKC.
In (Wander et al., 2005) , it is shown for WSNs that Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) algorithm to have a significant advantage over Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm, as it reduces computation time and the amount of transmitted and stored data. Hence ECC is the best known algorithm in PKC (Gura et al., 2004) ,(Rifa and Herrera, 2011); we adopt it to our TLUA scheme. By doing so, not only the scalability of the network is improved, but also security of the scheme is enhanced. In TLUA scheme, ECC is used for digital signature generation and verification between the users and the CHs; and Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) key exchange protocol is used to exchange secret keys among CHs and sensor nodes.
System Model:
In TLUA scheme, WSN consists of CHs and sensor nodes, representing a Heterogeneous network structure: 1) CHs have high processing capability and long lasting power supplies, such as iPAQ, PDA 1 . 2) Sensor nodes have low processing capability and limited power supplies, such as MICA-2 motes 2 . CHs are assumed as trusted gateways to the sensor nodes. TLUA scheme takes advantage of high processing power CHs to decrease the processing load on the sensor nodes. Hence they have better power supplies compared to sensor nodes, and are capable to run power hungry PKC algorithms. Therefore, between CHs and users, a PKC algorithm (namely ECC) is used for UA purposes. Once a user is authenticated to a CH then allowed to access the sensor nodes through that CH. Since it is low power demanding, between CHs and sensor nodes an SKC algorithm is used for UA.
TLUA allows a user to register once and authenticate to the network many times. Users can also change the password anytime at will. We consider large WSN (100's of sensor nodes) deployed in any variety of environments. In our WSN's architecture, base station (BS) is the point of central control, which serves as a trusted key management facility. BS is many orders of magnitude more powerful than sensor nodes. Typically, BSs have enough battery power to surpass the lifetime of all sensor nodes, sufficient memory to store cryptographic keys, stronger processors, and means for communicating with outside networks. After the deployment, sensor nodes form groups, called clusters, see Fig. 1 . For each cluster, a powerful node (e.g. PDA) is assigned as a CH. CHs have higher communication power than sensor nodes and therefore possess far more radio transmission coverage. CHs can communicate with each other and also with BS. In order to protect the keying materials, CHs are equipped with tamperresistant hardware. This assumption is reasonable, hence the number of CHs in a heterogeneous WSN is relatively small (e.g., approximately 20-30 CHs for 1,000 sensors), and the cost of such tamper-resistant hardware is small (Du et al., 2007) . Users are equipped with portable computing devices, such as laptops, with no power constraints compared to sensor nodes. Users interact with the WSN for data query and retrieval. After processing sensed information; the sensor node either sends the data upon event detection or stores it to serve for the next query.
Key Agreement and Key Distribution:
In our scheme we considered a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) issuing ECC throughout the WSN. The network structure is the same as suggested in ).
One BS serves as the certification authority for the network. ECC is used for encryption and decryption, Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is used for digital certificate generation and verification. The difference between a digital signature and a certificate is verification of a digital certificate reveals the content whilst verification of a digital signature reveals the hash of the content (Aziz and Diffie, 1994) . ECDH key agreement protocol is used for key agreement between a CH (e.g. A) and their member sensor node(s), to be used as pair-wise MAC keys, K A,s . Initially, BS generates elliptic curve parameters for ECC and ECDSA operations to be used by BS, CHs and users, and for ECDH operations to be used by CHs and sensor nodes. These parameters are; base point P , private key pri key BS and the corresponding public key pub key BS = pri key BS × P (where × stands for elliptic curve point multiplication) itself. BS also generates private-public key pairs for each sensor node (pri key s , pub key s = pri key s × P ) and for each CH (pri key CH , pub key CH = pri key CH × P ). Each sensor is pre-loaded with their private -public key pair and also the public key of the CHs. Each CH is pre-loaded with their private-public key pair and also the public keys of the sensor nodes. In our scheme, between CHs and sensor nodes, in order to let both parties agree on a shared secret key, ECDH key agreement protocol is used as discussed in . ECDH allows two parties to agree on the We assume that the key distribution between BS and CHs is established in a manner that all the CHs have the public key of the BS, namely pub key BS .
Authentication:
TLUA includes three phases: Registration, Authentication, and Password Change. The operational functionality (handshake messages) of all these phases are summarized and illustrated in Fig. 2 b .
b For abbreviations and notations used in Fig. 2 , please refer to 
User registration
User sends a request to the BS for registration to the WSN along with his ID encrypted with the public key of the BS:
BS has the ID list of the legitimate users and provides each legitimate user a certificate. BS has private and public key pair (pri key BS , pub key BS ) and the certificate is the user's ID signed by the BS, using the private key (pri key BS ). As a final step, BS sends back the certificate to the user.
In user authentication phase, with the public key of the BS (pub key BS ), each CH can verify the certificate of the user and extract the ID of the user, namely ID U .
User authentication
All the communications within the network are routed by the CHs. Let us consider the scenario where the user wants to access data aggregated at a sensor s (suppose A is CH of s), and let us also assume that A is the closest CH in the proximity of the user (intra communications and authentications among CHs are beyond the scope of our paper). Then the authentication process includes the following steps:
• Step 1) The user sends his certificate cert U and time stamp T U along with the hash value of those concatenated by user ID, ID U to A:
where means concatenation and H stands for hashing algorithm such as SHA-1. In this representation, the hash value represents the variable (changes with the time, protected by time stamp) password of the user.
Upon receiving an authentication request from the user, A first checks whether T U is valid, if yes then it can verify the certificate of the user by using the public key of the BS (pub key BS ) and extract the ID of the user, namely ID U :
Finally A verifies the hash value of the user by using the ID of the user: 
If all of these are successful, then the user is authentic. After successful authentication, sensor s is ready to send data to the user. s may send a short message to inform the user that he is authenticated via A.
User Password Change and Certificate Renewal
TLUA allows users to change their password by means of certificate renewal at their will. Users can do so through BS. The user encrypts the new public key (pub key * U ) and its new ID ID * U with its current private key (pri key U ):
After receiving the encrypted message, BS decrypts it by using the current public key of the user (pub key U ):
Then BS can sign the new ID (ID * U ) by its private key (pri key BS ) to obtain a new certificate (cert * U ) and send it back to the user:
Security analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the TLUA scheme. In a two-party communication case, data authentication can be achieved through a purely symmetric mechanism: The sender and the receiver share a secret key to compute a Message Authentication Code (MAC) of all communicated data. When a message with a correct MAC arrives, the receiver knows that it must have been sent by the sender. In our TLUA scheme, MAC is used for all transmissions which involve sensor nodes and PKC (especially the ECC) is used in the backbone architecture of the network, namely between user side, BS and CH. Accordingly, not only the security aspect of the network is increased, but also most of the advantages of PKC and SKC are retained. Authentication and encryption techniques can prevent an outsider to launch a Sybil attack c against c In Sybil attack, an adversary captures a single sensor node and illegitimately claims multiple identities to the sensor network.
WSN. However, an insider cannot be prevented from participating to the network. (S)he can achieve this by using the identities of the nodes (s)he has compromised. Besides, using globally shared keys allows an insider to masquerade as any node. PKC can prevent such an insider attack. It is one of the reasons to adopt it in our TLUA scheme. Although SKC is efficient in processing time for sensor networks, they generally require complicated key management, which needs large memory and communications overhead. On the other hand, PKC has simple key management with the more computational time trade-off. With the recent progress in ECC, Wang et al. (Wang et al., 2008) shows that PKC can be more advantageous than SKC not only with key management but also in terms of the memory usage and security resilience. This is another reason to adopt PKC to our TLUA scheme. In TLUA users can be added and revoked on the fly. CHs only need to keep the public key of the BS. Whereas in TTUA CHs need to keep the password list of the users every time.
In the TTUA scheme, the hash value of the user password is sent to the BS through a secure channel. Also, the hash values list of the CHs secret keys is sent from BS to the user through the secure channel. It means that in case of any intrusion into the secure channel, the WSN would be compromised. In our TLUA scheme, owing to the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), a secure channel is not needed between user and BS. Therefore users do not have to plug in to the BS for key exchange. This means that users in our network are free to move anywhere but the coverage area of the BS.
In TTUA if the secret key (K A ) of the CH A is captured, then the network is compromised and all the user passwords stored on A must be revoked. In TTUA scheme, users change their passwords through CHs. In our TLUA scheme, users directly communicate with BS to change the password. Since CH is not involved in the password change session, TLUA is less vulnerable compared to TTUA. In TTUA scheme, a hash function (SHA-1) is used to secure the authentication message between the user and the CH. In our TLUA scheme, we use ECC which is more secure than SHA-1 given that both use same sized keys.
Node compromising attacks
Since CHs are equipped with tamper resistant hardware, it is impossible to compromise them. This way the SKC pair-wise keys between each sensor and associated CH is secured on the CH side. Also the PKC keying materials between CHs and users are also secured. The weakest element of our proposed scheme is the sensor nodes, since they do not have tamper resistant hardware. In terms of security, we do not let sensor nodes carry any valuable information to compromise the overall WSN. Hence the secret keys between a CH and each member sensor node are different, the furthest point any attacker can reach is the compromising of the link communication between the sensor node captured and the related CH. To defend this, in our TLUA scheme the secret keys between CHs and sensor nodes are updated at certain periods with ECDH protocol.
Replay attacks
In the TLUA scheme an attacker cannot re-use the previous successful login message H(cert U T U ID U ), because the time stamp T U generated by the user protects this message to be used again after a certain time. After the useful time passes, CH will not allow access to the user. Thus, reply attacks are defended that way.
Impersonation attacks
Our proposed scheme is resilient against impersonation attacks in the following manner: In authentication phase, an outsider tries to impersonate the login message
The fabricated ID will change the hash value and will be caught by the CH throughout the hash value verification:
Brute-force attacks
Our proposed scheme is resilient against brute force attacks in following manners:
• In the password change phase, an adversary intercepts the message (encrypt pri key U (pub key * U ID * U )) and tries to decrypt the message by estimating the public key of the user. So (s)he needs to try every combination of (pub key U ) to decrypt the password change message. This kind of attack is known as brute force attack and is practically and cryptographically infeasible to be successful in useful time.
• In the password change phase, an adversary intercepts the message (encrypt pri key U (pub key * U ID * U )) and tries to estimate the private key of the user from the encrypted message, which is practically and cryptographically infeasible in useful time.
Performance Evaluation by Analysis
In this section, we analytically evaluate (by using theoretical calculations and also practical results from the literature) the performance of our proposed TLUA scheme and compare it to TTUA, TJY, and BGR schemes for the following criterions: storage requirement (memory), scalability, computational cost and communication overhead. 
Storage
For Cluster Heads: TTUA scheme requires each CH to store user IDs and hashed password values, which adds up with the increasing number of users. As mentioned in , for the TTUA scheme, assuming that there are n number of users, user ID size is 8 bytes, and the hashed password value is 20 bytes, each CH has to store n × 28 + 120bytes of data for the users. Whereas in our TLUA scheme, to authenticate the users, the only key that CHs have to store in their memory is the public key of the BS (pub key BS ). This advantage is brought by the PKC. In our scheme, since we use 160 bits (20 bytes) elliptic curves, the public key size is 40 bytes (keep in mind that, for a 160 bits elliptic curve, certificate is 40 bytes long, public key is 40 bytes long and private key is 20 bytes long). Assuming n=1,000; the memory required to store keys on each CH are as shown in Table 2 . Since TJY and BGR schemes do not require any CHs in their network, we will denote them as N/A in the table. For Sensor Nodes: In TLUA scheme, each sensor node need to store private key of it self and public key of the CH for ECDH operation d . After the ECDH operation, CH and sensor nodes agree on a secret key K A,s which is 20 bytes long. As mentioned earlier, for ECDH, public key is 40 bytes long and private key is 20 bytes long. So, total memory space required for the keys are 80 bytes long. In TTUA scheme, each sensor stores a secret key K A,s which is 20 bytes long. In TJY scheme, every sensor node stores 10 bytes long key for each user. Therefore each sensor node needs to store n × 10bytes long keying material. Finally, in BGR scheme, each sensor node need to store public key of the certification authority, which is 40 bytes. Assuming n=1,000; the memory required to store keys on the each sensor node is as shown in Table 2 .
Scalability
As mentioned in the previous section, owing to the PKC approach, the memory space available on CHs in TLUA scheme does not change with the number of users. So we can state that there is no limit on the number of users. Literally speaking, TLUA scheme may d This public key-private key pair is used by ECDH key agreement protocol to generate K A,s in the network initialization phase. manage thousands of users without any problem. Where as in TTUA scheme, memory space available on CHs is inversely proportional to the number of users. In TJY scheme, memory space available on sensor nodes is inversely proportional to the number of users, whereas in BGR scheme (owing to the PKC approach) it does not change with the number of users. Following the calculations from the previous section, if the memory size of each CH and sensor node for storing the keys is allocated as 2 Kbytes, then the number of users that would be supported in both TTUA and TLUA schemes are as shown in Table 3 . Its apparent that TLUA and BGR schemes are very flexible and scalable compared to TTUA and TJY schemes in terms total number of users to be supported. Although according to our calculations there is no limit on the number of users for TLUA and BGR schemes, we limit this number to 10,000; which is reasonable for practical applications.
Computation
To compare the computational cost we have two comparison criterion: time cost and energy cost. We are interested on the operations running on CHs and sensor nodes but not interested in the operations running on the user devices and the base station. After we calculate the time cost of each scheme, we will calculate the energy cost of each scheme accordingly.
As a reference for our calculations, we used broad variety of reliable research results from the literature, especially papers on application of cryptography primitives over 8-bit CPU devices (namely Atmel ATmega microcontrollers) and hand held PDA devices (namely iPAQ). For the calculations involving sensor nodes, we referred to following research papers: (Wander et al., 2005) , (Gura et al., 2004) , (Gaubatz and Ozturk, 2005) , (Blass and Zitterbart, 2005) , (Gaubatz et al., 2004) , , (Malan et al., 2004) , (Piotrowski et al., 2006) , (Batina et al., 2006) , and (Trakadas et al., 2008) . For the calculations involving CHs, we referred to following research papers: , (Potlapally et al., 2003) , (Potlapally et al., 2006) . For CH devices, we will consider iPAQ H3670 PDA. For sensor nodes, we will consider Berkeley's MICA2 motes e .
e Atmel ATmega microcontroller is the main chip on MICA2 motes. 
Time cost
We define T M AC , T SHA1 , T RC5 , T XOR and T V ER as computational time cost of performing hash based message authentication code (CBC-MAC), hash function (SHA-1), symmetric encryption (RC5), XOR operation, and digital signature verification with ECDSA, respectively. Following this convention the computational time costs of TLUA, TTUA, TJY and BGR schemes are presented in Table 4 . Since TJY and BGR schemes do not require any CHs in their network, we will denote their time cost as N/A in the table.
According to practical implementations on MICA2 motes (sensor nodes), the computational time required for each security primitive are as shown in Table 5 .
In the case of BGR scheme, which is a PKC approach to UA in WSNs, authors (Benenson et al., 2005) provided their experimental result as follows: Authentication takes 375 sec of time on a sensor node. Considering that the paper was published in 2005, we revised this number with latest findings in the literature (Potlapally et al., 2007) , (Trakadas et al., 2008) . With recently discovered fast point multiplications, ECDSA signature verification costs as less as 3.27 sec. Literally speaking, in our analysis, we used up to date numbers in order to provide a fare comparison.
According to practical implementations on PDA devices (CHs) (i.e. iPAQ H3670), the energy spent for each security primitive are summarized in Table 6 .
By using practical results of Table 5 and Table 6  we updated Table 4 as shown in Table 7 . According to these results we see that TTUA is the fastest scheme and BGR is slowest (almost 1,000 fold slower). Although our TLUA scheme is using PKC, its performance results are very close to the SKC based schemes (TTUA and TJY) owing to the high speed processing capabilities of its CHs. To provide a better comparison, we plotted the total time cost (in msec) of each scheme as shown in Fig.  3 . In our TLUA scheme, CHs are not involved in the registration phase, therefore the computation cost is zero. The authentication phase takes almost 138 milliseconds for TLUA scheme and 8 milliseconds for TTUA scheme. Which means that TLUA scheme is slower than (almost 15 fold slower) TTUA scheme for the authentication phase, which is expected. This is the trade off for changing cryptography approach from SKC to PKC. But keeping in mind that, BGR scheme requires 6.545 sec for the authentication phase, our scheme is almost 50 times faster owing to the high processing powered CHs.
Energy cost
As in the case of time cost calculations, we define E M AC , E SHA1 , E RC5 , E XOR and E V ER as computational energy cost of performing hash based message f Note that this figure is plotted in logarithmic scale. Table 8 . Since TJY and BGR schemes do not require any CHs in their network, we will denote their energy cost as N/A in the table.
According to practical implementations on MICA2 motes (sensor nodes), the computational energy spent for each security primitive are as shown in Table 9 .
According to practical implementations on PDA devices (CHs) (i.e. iPAQ H3670), the energy spent for each security primitive are summarized in Table 10 . By using practical results of Table 9 and Table 10  we updated Table 8 as shown in Table 11 g . These results are very consistent with our findings for time cost calculations in previous section.
According to these results we see that TTUA is the most energy efficient scheme and BGR is the worst (almost 300 fold more energy consumption). Although our TLUA scheme is using PKC, its performance results are very close to the SKC based schemes (TTUA and TJY) owing to the heterogeneous network architecture. To provide a better comparison, we plotted the total g Throughout these calculations we kept data size fixed as 20 bytes. Figure 5 Comparison of total energy costs (CH + s) of TLUA, TTUA, TJY and BGR schemes h energy cost (in microJoules) of each scheme as shown in Fig. 5 . In our TLUA scheme, CHs are not involved in the registration phase, therefore the energy cost is zero. The authentication phase spends almost 200 milliJoules for TLUA scheme and 300 microJoules for TTUA scheme. Which means that TLUA scheme spends more (almost 650 fold) energy than TTUA scheme for the authentication phase, which is expected. This is the trade off for changing cryptography approach from SKC to PKC. But keeping in mind that most (> 99%) of this energy is spent on the CH. In our TLUA scheme, energy spent on the sensor node is same as the one on TTUA scheme, which is 180 microJoules. Compared to BGR scheme (which requires 90 milliJoules),TLUA scheme is very energy efficient (500 fold) on the sensor node.
Communication
For communication cost, we are interested in the communications involving either CHs or sensor node s. To calculate communications cost, we define a number of notations as follows (all of these are in number of hops):
h Note that this figure is plotted in logarithmic scale. For registration phase, TLUA has no cost on CHs or sensor nodes, whereas TTUA needs to broadcast user ID's and passwords to all CHs. For authentication phase, both schemes have the same cost, 2 messages sent between user and CH, and 2 messages sent between CH and sensor node. The communication costs of the both schemes are summarized in Table 12 . This table provides the communications between; 1) the users and CHs, 2) CHs and sensor nodes (s).
According to the comparison of Table 12 , we can conclude that both TLUA and TTUA schemes have same communication cost for the authentication phase. However, for the registration phase TTUA scheme requires a costly network-wide broadcast message, where as TLUA scheme requires none. So as a summary, our TLUA scheme outperforms TTUA scheme in terms of communications overhead.
Performance Evaluation by Simulation
We used SENSE (Sensor Network Simulator and Emulator) 3 to simulate and compare energy consumption and delay between TLUA (Butun and Sankar, 2011) , TTUA , and TJY (Tseng et al., 2007) schemes. The simulation results show that the average energy consumption and delay time of different network topologies. Because cluster heads are much more powerful than sensor nodes, we only considered energy consumption of the sensor nodes. For each network topology, user's location and the login-node are randomly changed within the sensor field.
Simulation Model
The network deployment is similar to (Du et al., 2007) with a BS and 300 sensors randomly distributed in a 300 m × 300 m area. There are additional 20 CHs in the sensor field (Du et al., 2007) . The transmission range of a sensor s and a CH is 60 m and 150 m, respectively. Sensors and CHs are formed in clusters. Each cluster has one CH. Sensors in the same cluster are connected with its CH via one or more hops. We use the same energy model used in ns-2.1b8a
4 that requires 0.66 W , 0.359 W , and 0.035 W for transmitting, receiving, and idling, respectively. We set the power consumption rate for SHA-1 and CBC-MAC calculation as 0.48 W according to (Du et al., 2007) and (Xue and Ganz, 2003) . As analyzed in (Karlof et al., 2004) and (Lee et al., 2005) , we set the time consumption for computing a CBC-MAC and a SHA-1 as 7.1 ms and 3.5 ms, respectively. The simulation uses MAC 802.11 Distributed Coordination Function (DCF). Two-ray ground is used as the radio propagation model. For routing in TLUA, TTUA and TJY schemes, we applied Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) protocol. User ID length is 8 bytes, SHA-1 value is 20 bytes. As discussed in (Karlof et al., 2004) , the choice of 4 bytes MAC is not security detrimental in the context of sensor networks. So we applied 4 bytes CBC-MAC for every message and ran the simulation with five different network topologies. For each topology, five scenarios are applied, in which user's location and the login-node is randomly selected. For TJY scheme, we set the gate-way node in the center of the sensor field. We then averaged the results from those scenarios.
Results
Our simulation results are shown in Fig. 7 (this graphic compares total energy consumption on the sensor nodes for the authentication and registration phases) and Fig.  8 (this graphic compares overall computational times for the authentication and registration phases). For one registration, the user is authenticated 1, 5, 10, and 20 times and in the graphs it is shown on the x-axis, respectively. Fig. 7 shows that the energy consumption (the energy consumption on sensor nodes for computation processes and for communication packets) of TLUA and TTUA is almost same and they are about half of TJY scheme. This is because computation cost of TLUA and TTUA are less than TJY scheme and they do not require any extra communication with the gate-way node during authentication process. However, TLUA and TTUA consume the same amount of energy because in both schemes the communication cost between the user and targeted sensor, and the computational cost of the sensors are the same. This is consistent with our analytical results (See Fig. 6 ). Fig. 8 shows that total delay time of TLUA is slightly greater than of TTUA but far less than TJY. This is consistent with our analytical results (See Fig.  4 ). Although we used ECC signature verification in our scheme, this did not drop the overall performance significantly, owing to CHs with high processing speed (ECC signature verification takes about 1.65 ms on CH equipped with iPAQ (Rodriguez et al., 2004) ). 0.2 sec total delay of TLUA scheme is very compatible with TTUA scheme and way much better than TJY and BGR schemes. Furthermore, if the processing speed of the CH is increased (i.e. more powerful mobile devices), the delay on CH would be decreased dramatically, and our scheme would perform better than TTUA scheme.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we present a novel UA scheme for heterogeneous WSNs, named as Two Level User Authentication (TLUA) scheme and then evaluate its performance against its rivals. Proposed scheme employs both PKC and SKC approaches, so that it takes advantage of both schemes. Our analysis and simulation results have shown that TLUA scheme is not only more secure and yet scalable than existing SKC based schemes, but also requires lesser processing power and provides higher energy efficiency than existing PKC based schemes. As proposed, our scheme brings advantages (scalability, flexibility) of PKC, without requirement of extra cost (in terms of energy) on the sensor nodes. Besides, time cost is very negligible compared to the other PKC based schemes (namely BGR scheme).
In our future work, hardware implementation (with real sensor devices) of the proposed TLUA scheme will be investigated and the results will be published.
